Skip to agency navigation
Skip to main content

Official Website

of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

    The .gov means its official.

    Local, state, and federal government websites often end in .gov. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania government websites and email systems use "pennsylvania.gov" or "pa.gov" at the end of the address. Before sharing sensitive or personal information, make sure you're on an official state website. 

    Local, state, and federal government websites often end in .gov. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania government websites and email systems use "pennsylvania.gov" or "pa.gov" at the end of the address. Before sharing sensitive or personal information, make sure you're on an official state website. 

    Local, state, and federal government websites often end in .gov. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania government websites and email systems use "pennsylvania.gov" or "pa.gov" at the end of the address. Before sharing sensitive or personal information, make sure you're on an official state website. 

    Local, state, and federal government websites often end in .gov. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania government websites and email systems use "pennsylvania.gov" or "pa.gov" at the end of the address. Before sharing sensitive or personal information, make sure you're on an official state website. 

    Local, state, and federal government websites often end in .gov. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania government websites and email systems use "pennsylvania.gov" or "pa.gov" at the end of the address. Before sharing sensitive or personal information, make sure you're on an official state website. 

    Local, state, and federal government websites often end in .gov. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania government websites and email systems use "pennsylvania.gov" or "pa.gov" at the end of the address. Before sharing sensitive or personal information, make sure you're on an official state website. 

    Local, state, and federal government websites often end in .gov. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania government websites and email systems use "pennsylvania.gov" or "pa.gov" at the end of the address. Before sharing sensitive or personal information, make sure you're on an official state website. 

    Local, state, and federal government websites often end in .gov. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania government websites and email systems use "pennsylvania.gov" or "pa.gov" at the end of the address. Before sharing sensitive or personal information, make sure you're on an official state website. 

    Local, state, and federal government websites often end in .gov. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania government websites and email systems use "pennsylvania.gov" or "pa.gov" at the end of the address. Before sharing sensitive or personal information, make sure you're on an official state website. 

    Local, state, and federal government websites often end in .gov. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania government websites and email systems use "pennsylvania.gov" or "pa.gov" at the end of the address. Before sharing sensitive or personal information, make sure you're on an official state website. 

     

    April 23, 2024, Risk-Limiting Audit Report

    For the 2024 primary election, the Democratic race for state treasurer was randomly selected for review. The results of the audited sample compared to the initial reported results confirmed that the outcome of the election was accurate.

    To conduct this specific audit: 

    • Counties created ballot manifests, which are spreadsheets showing the number of ballots counted for the selected contest and details on how the ballots are organized and stored. This collection of information allows batches of ballots to be identified, retrieved, and examined if selected for the audit.
    • After counties uploaded their ballot manifests to an open-source audit software tool called Arlo, Department of State staff generated a random 20-digit seed number during a livestreamed dice roll.
    • That seed number was then entered into the audit software, which selected the random list of ballot batches for certain counties to retrieve. In total, 60 batches of ballots in 27 counties were randomly chosen to be audited.
    • Officials in the selected counties retrieved the randomly selected batches of ballots and verified the ballots cast for the Democratic race for state treasurer.
    • The audit software system then tallied and analyzed the results.​​

    The audit identified two vote discrepancies across batches of ballots. Such discrepancies are typically the result of human error when manually tabulating audit results or stray and unclear marks on a ballot, which can lead to subjective decisions about a voter’s intent. 

    Download detailed results of the 2024 Primary Election risk-limiting audit.